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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent~ 
-vs.-
VERNON HOWARD CANNON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10187 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant appeals, challenging his conviction to the 
crime of automobile homicide in violation of 76-30-7.4, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried by jury trial on the crime 
charged in the information, to-wit: automobile homicide. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the conviction 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts: 
The appellant, Vernon Howard Cannon, was charged 
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with the crime of automobile homicide in that it was alleged 
that the appellant operated his motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated, resulting in the death of Fleming Christensen. The 
evidence disclosed that the appellant, Vernon Howard 
Cannon, 54, was the co-owner with a Mr. Robert E. Lee 
of the Parley's Canyon Cafe located above Mountain Dell 
Reservoir in Salt Lake County (R. 194, 195, 226). On the 
night of the 21st of October, 1963, Cannon left his usual 
employment and went to the Parley's Canyon Cafe at ap-
proximately 6:00P.M. (R. 230). Subsequently, he and 
Mr. Lee made a journey in search of an employee of the 
cafe and went to Keetley, Park City, Kimball's Junction, 
Fort Ute, and returned to the cafe at approximately 8:10 
P.M. (R. 197-200). Thereafter, Mr. Cannon ate in the 
trailer of Mr. Lee; had some coffee and then started down 
Parley's Canyon ( R. 202, 203) . 
Franklin Lester Hewlett, Fleming Christensen and Gary 
F. Barrus had been playing basketball and visiting friends 
(R. 94) and were driving home in a Morris Miner Station 
Wagon being driven by the Hewlett boy. All three boys 
were 17 years of age (R. 93). Fleming Christensen was 
sitting in the front seat opposite the driver and Gary Barrus 
was sitting in the rear seat behind the Hewlett boy (R. 93-
94). They headed north on Wasatch Boulevard and stopped 
at the intersection of 33rd South and Wasatch Boulevard 
for a stoplight (R. 94, 98, 106). As the light changed, the 
three boys proceeded north on Wasatch Boulevard and 
pulled into the outside right-hand lane (R. 98). Wasatch 
Boulevard is a four lane highway with two lanes each way 
and the road dips between 33rd South and the Parley's 
Canyon Interchange. Each lane on one side is separated 
by dotted white lines ( R. 69) and two wide yellow lines 
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separate the opposing lanes of traffic (R. 68). The road is 
blacktopped and there are semaphores at 33rd South on 
the south and the Parley's Canyon Interchange on the north 
(R. 70). As the Morris Miner vehicle proceeded north on 
Wasatch Boulevard, the appellant, operating a 1961 Chev-
rolet, drove down Parley's Canyon, stopped at the sema-
phore at the Parley's Canyon Interchange with Wasatch 
Boulevard (R. 233) and proceeded south on Wasatch 
Boulevard. The appellant's vehicle appeared to stop at the 
dip between the interchange and 33rd South and head off 
toward the west outside lane of traffic ( R. 112) . Appellant 
then started up, crossed east into the south lane of traffic and 
made several directional changes back and forth in an 
apparent effort to correct himself ( R. 113 ) . The vehicle 
then started to accelerate rapidly up the hill, looked like it 
was going to hit a grain truck which was also proceeding 
south on Wasatch Boulevard, then veered across the double 
line into the northbound lane of traffic, striking the Morris 
Miner Station Wagon head-on (R. 95, 98, 113, 114). As a 
result of the collision, Fleming Christensen and Franklin 
Hewlett were killed ( R. 11 7) . Gary Barrus sustained in-
juries and was knocked unconscious (R. 95). Immediately 
after the accident, Mr. George W. Golightly, who observed 
the accident, went to the Chevrolet which the appellant 
had been driving to offer assistance (R. 100). He detected 
an odor of alcohol on the appellant's breath (R. 101) and 
indicated that the appellant appeared in shock (R. 105). 
The impact of the collision caused both vehicles to 
change direction so that when they came to rest, the Chev-
rolet was pointing north and the Morris Miner Station 
Wagon, which had been knocked on its side, was pointing 
south (Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 12). A 40-foot skid mark from the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
rear wheel of the Chevrolet to the point of impact was meas-
ured by sheriff's officers ( R. 7 7 ) . 
The appellant was taken to the Salt Lake County 
Hospital and at 11:54 p.m., approximately an hour and 
forty-four minutes after the accident, a blood sample was 
taken from the appellant by Dr. Burton Janis (R. 120, 124). 
The blood sample was taken by sterile syringe (R. 121) and 
the blood placed in a bottle provided by Officer Jack Retal-
lick of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office ( R. 121, 123). 
Officer Retallick had obtained the vial from a cabinet in the 
County Hospital (R. 135). The vial appeared empty and 
after the blood was placed in it, it was sealed and taped 
( R. 13 7) . Officer Retallick put the sample in his coat, took 
it home and placed it in his refrigerator and the next day, in 
the company of Officer VanRoosendaal, took the sample 
to the State Chemist's office ( R. 140). Mr. H. Kent Francis, 
the State Chemist, performed the Harger blood alcohol 
test upon the blood sample and determined the percentage 
of alcohol to blood to be .193 per cent. The vial containing 
the blood was sealed at the time it was delivered to Dr. 
Francis (R. 148). 
Dr. Stewart C. Harvey, a pharmacologist at the Univer-
sity of Utah Medical School, testified at the time of trial 
that the driving ability of most everyone would be impaired 
with a blood alcohol level of .1 0 ( R. 169) . He testified that 
it would take approximately 13 ounces of whiskey to raise 
a person's blood alcohol level to .193. He further indicated 
that the normal body processes bum up or metabolize ap-
proximately .015 to .030 per cent of alcohol per hour. He 
further indicated that, generally, absorption will be com-
plete approximately one hour after consumption and that 
in order to ascertain the blood alcohol level at the time of an 
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accident, it is important to know when consumption oc-
curred (R. 177). 
The defendant offered the testimony of Mr. Robert E. 
Lee to the effect that he was with the appellant prior to the 
time that he drove down Parley's Canyon and was involved 
in the accident. He testified concerning the trip in search 
of their employee and indicated that during the trip the 
appellant had had coffee (R. 199) and that subsequently 
he ate beef stew and drank addditional coffee ( R. 202, 203). 
Mr. Lee indicated that he had been drinking himself earlier 
in the evening and, therefore, could not smell alcohol on the 
breath of others (R. 207). He stated that it would have 
been possible for the appellant to have been drinking during 
the evening and he did not know whether the appellant had 
been drinking or not ( R. 214, 216) . He did not see the a p-
pellant take a drink during the time he was in his company. 
He testified, however, that he had "no idea" that the appel-
lant "had consumed" liquor ( R. 202, 204) . 
Theilda Lee, wife of Robert Lee, testified that she saw 
the appellant at the Parley's Canyon Cafe at approximately 
6:00P.M. and did not smell liquor on his breath. At no 
time did she see him take any liquor ( R. 220). Subse-
quently, after returning from the trip with her husband, he 
ate with them and watched TV and she did not notice the 
appellant drinking nor smell alcohol on his breath. 
The appellant admitted consuming part of a pint of 
whiskey, which he said was about one-half full, which was 
in his car. The appellant indicated that he drank the whis-
key on the way down Parley's Canyon. He stated he stopped 
after leaving the restaurant at a point about three miles 
from the restaurant and five miles from the Parley's Inter-
change semaphore. He testified that he remembered stop-
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ping at the semaphore, but did not remember anything 
thereafter. The alcohol he drank, he claimed, was 86 Proof. 
After the accident, he was of the opinion that he had gone 
to sleep and run off the road ( R. 235) , although he told 
police officers that he either fell asleep or "passed out" (R. 
128). Dr. Gordon R. Evans testified that if eight ounces 
of 100 Proof alcohol had been consumed approximately ten 
to fifteen minutes before the accident, that the appellant 
would have had at the time of the accident a blood alcohol 
level of between .02 and .03. He further indicated that the 
appellant would have had good judgment had he merely 
had a mild dosage of alcohol absorption. He indicated that 
if eight ounces of 100 Proof alcohol were consumed, that 
the blood alcohol level after full absorption would be .191 
(R. 252). However, the Doctor indicated that this compu-
tation did not take into consideration body metabolism or 
oxidation and that oxidation during the period of absorp-
tion would probably be .04 (R. 267). 
The appellant's sister was called as a witness and testi-
fied that in March 1962, the appellant had had an illness 
which affected his inner ear ( R. 191 ) . The appellant him-
self testified that at that time he had "Meniere's disease." 
The disease he characterized as causing a loss of balance 
( R. 228) . The disease lasted approximately three months 
( R. 229) . Dr. Evans treated the appellant for the disease 
and also characterized the disease as causing the loss of 
balance, but indicated that it does not result in uncon-
sciousness or an unawareness of what is occurring. He 
further testified that alcohol does not necessarily aggravate 
the disease (R. 256). He last saw the appelllant when treat-
ing him for the disease in October, 1962, approximately a 
year prior to the accident. Dr. D. C. Bernson testified that 
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he made a neurological examination of the appellant after 
the accident and was of the opinion that he had suffered a 
cerebral contusion which caused the loss of consciousness. 
He felt that, generally, someone who had had Meniere's 
disease would know that it was occurring. He indicated 
that there was no evidence of Meniere's disease having 
occurred, but that if it was not in progress, he would have 
been unable to detect its occurring ( R. 286, 288) . Subse-
quent to the completion of the testimony, the trial court 
struck all evidence relating to Meniere's disease. 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned a ver-
dict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EVI-
DENCE RELATING TO MENIERE'S DISEASE. 
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in grant-
ing the State's motion to strike the evidence relating to the 
appellant having had Meniere's disease. The motion to 
strike was made at the end of the appellant's case and prior 
to the time the case was submitted to the jury. It is sub-
mitted that the basis upon which the appellant claims the 
court erred is without legal foundation. The evidence that 
had been received by the court relating to the appellant's 
affliction with Meniere's disease, it is submitted, was too 
remote and speculative to warrant the jury considering it 
and the court acted within its sound discretion in granting 
the State's motion to strike. 
The appellant's sister, Harriett Snarr, testified that the 
appellant had had an illness which affected his inner ear 
and that the affliction had occurred in March, 1962. The 
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appellant himself did not testify with reference to suffering 
from Meniere's disease at the time of the accident. His 
testimony was to the effect that he had not suffered from the 
disease or sought medical attention since October, 1962, 
approximately one year prior to the time of the accident 
which occurred on October 21, 1963. Mr. and Mrs. Robert 
Lee, who were with the appellant in the hours immediately 
preceding the accident, gave no evidence in support of the 
proposition that the appellant was in any way suffering 
from Meniere's disease. The appellant's testimony was to 
the effect that he thought he had fallen asleep at the inter-
change light at Parley's Canyon and Wasatch Boulevard. 
At the time he was in the hospital, subsequent to the acci-
dent, he told the investigating officers that he either passed 
out or fell asleep. The examining physicians indicated that 
there was no evidence that the appellant was suffering from 
Meniere's disease at the time of the examination immedi-
ately subsequent to the accident. Dr. Gordon Evans, who 
treated the defendant for his affliction, described the disease 
as one involving the loss of balance, but indicated that un-
consciousness did not result and that a person so affiicted is 
generally aware of what he is doing. The only evidence 
tending to support the appellant's claim of relevancy was 
that the disease was a chronic or recurrent disease which 
could occur after periods of lapse. Consequently, there was 
no affirmative evidence of the appellant having suffered the 
effects of Meniere's disease within a period of one year prior 
to the accident. There was no affirmative evidence of any 
kind that the appellant had suffered from Meniere's disease 
at the time of the accident. It would be speculation and 
inference upon inference to conclude that the accident had 
been caused by Meniere's disease. The appellant by his 
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own testimony evidenced no manifestations of the disease. 
Evidence was offered at the trial that the appellant's 
memory was impeded by retrogressive amnesia. It would be 
necessary to support error to infer that: 
1. The appellant's loss of consciousness did not in fact 
take place until after the accident. 
2. That the chronic and recurrent disease which had 
not afflicted the appellant for over a year had sud-
denly struck him and that it had immediately sub-
sided between the time of the accident and the time 
which he was examined at the hospital. 
Further, it would be necessary to infer that the appellant 
had no recollection of any of the events which might have 
been precipitated by the disease. 
The appellant's principle argument in support of his con-
tention that the trial court erred in striking the evidence 
are legal arguments unrelated to the posture of this case. 
It is admitted that generally a motion to strike comes too 
late if it appears that the evidence, when offered on its face, 
is inadmissible. Further, it is admitted that a party may not 
usually avail himself of a motion to strike evidence which 
he offers. However, in this case, neither of these rules are 
applicable. The first evidence which came in unobjected to 
relating to Meniere's disease was evidence from the appel-
lant's sister. Further, the evidence that appellant had in 
fact suffered from Meniere's disease, which was offered by 
the appellant himself, would appear to be relevant at first 
blush and would appear to be the type of evidence which 
would be connected up by other evidence tending to show 
its relationship to the event involved. The evidence, there-
fore, was not that type of evidence which at first blush 
would warrant the prosecution in opposing its receipt. How-
ever, after examination into the nature of the disease and 
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the facts surrounding the appellant's condition, it became 
apparent that there was no basis, except remote specula-
tion, to warrant the evidence remaining before the jury. 
It appearing that the necessary connecting evidence had 
not come forth, a motion to strike was proper. 
Secondly, the prosecution did not offer affirmative evi-
dence of Meniere's disease which would preclude their 
making the motion to strike. The prosecution merely cross-
examined one of the appellant's doctors concerning the 
pathology of the disease. The evidence offered in no way 
tended to remove the speculative and remote nature of the 
evidence then before the court. Consequently, it was appar-
ent that at the end of the reception of the evidence, the testi-
mony relating to Meniere's disease was of a remote and 
speculative nature. In such circumstances, it is within the 
sound discretion of the court to grant a motion to strike. 
It is generally recognized that a motion to strike rests 
within the sound discretion of the court. See State v. LopezJ 
55 N.M. 560, 237 P.2d 591. In 23A, C.J.S., Criminal LawJ 
§ 1069, p. 45, it is stated: 
"The grant or refusal of a motion to strike improper 
evidence may be viewed as a matter within the sound 
discretion of the court, as where the evidence was ad-
mitted without objection, see infra. § 1070. Thus a 
motion to strike evidence because of facts elicited on 
cross-examination showing it to be incompetent has 
been held to be discretionary with the court. Even 
though evidence may be considered technically rele-
vant, if it is only remotely relevant to the main issues 
and might tend to lead the jury down a collateral issue 
or might tend to subject them to some prejudice, a 
proper exercise of judicial discretion may require that 
it be stricken." 
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Since the evidence in the instant case was substantially 
remote and since the appellant himself as well as the medi-
cal evidence offered tended to show that at no time sur-
rounding the accident did he suffer from Meniere's syn-
drome, the trial court properly struck the evidence since it 
would tend to "lead the jury down a collateral issue." 
Further, it is well settled that the question of whether or not 
evidence should be received or considered by a jury when 
the evidence is remote to the issue at hand, is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. In State v. 
Schuman, 151 Kan. 749, 100P.2d 706 (1940), the Kansas 
Supreme Court noted: 
"***A ruling on the competency of evidence, based 
upon remoteness, ordinarily rests in the discretion of 
the trial court and will not be reversed unless it clearly 
appears the ruling constituted an abuse of sound judi-
cial discretion. * * *" 
Numerous other cases support that statement, State v. 
Jaynes, 165 Ore. 321, 107 P.2d 528; State v. Moore, 35 
Wash. 2d 106,211 P.2d 172;State v. Thomas, 8 Wash. 2d 
573, 113 P.2d 73; Dickey v. State, 97 Okla. Cr. 28, 257 P.2d 
319; People v. Bjornsen, 79 Cal. 2d 519, 180 P.2d 443; 
People v. Boggess, 194 Cal. 212, 228 Pac. 448. 
In State v. Cody, 361 P.2d 307 (Okla. Cr. 1961), the 
court noted that where the defendant sought to offer testi-
mony of a doctor to show the prosecutrix's mental condition 
a few years before the occurrence of the crime was properly 
excluded as being too remote to have probative value. In 
People v. MacArthur, 125 Cal. App. 2d 212, 270 P.2d 37 
( 1954), the appellant contended it was error in cross-
examining a State's witness for the court to exclude exami-
nation in a narcotics case as to appellant's lack of access. 
In rejecting the contention the court indicated: 
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"* * * The trial judge has wide discretion in deter-
mining the relevancy of evidence, Spolter v. Four-
Wheel Brake Service Co., 99 Cal.App.2d 690, 222 
P.2d 307; Gladstone v. Fortier, 22 Cal.App.2d 1, 70 
P.2d 255. Whether or not evidence is too remote is for 
the trial court which is vested with a wide discretion in 
making such decisions. * * *" 
In Butler v. State, 352 S.W.2d 744 (Texas Crim. 1962), 
the defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated. 
On appeal, he cited as error the failure of the court to allow 
hospital records into evidence which would show a physical 
condition of his stomach which would have been incon-
sistent with his drinking. The court ruled that the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evi-
dence where the records reflected that the condition for 
which he was treated did not involve his hospitalization 
until some seven months after the accident. The court felt 
this was sufficiently remote to the charge to allow the trial 
court to exclude the evidence. In the instant case, the evi-
dence was even further remote and there was additional 
evidence before the court tending to negative any inference 
that the previous condition had reoccurred at the time of 
the accident. See also 22A, C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 638. 
In 22A, C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 639, it is stated: 
"Evidence may be excluded when it is such as to 
furnish a basis for nothing more than a mere conjecture 
with reference to the transaction under investigation. 
* * *" 
The appellant has called the court's attention to the case 
of State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Supr. 277, 81 A.2d 811 ( 1951). 
That case in no way is relevant or of any precedent in favor 
of the appellant. There the defendant \vas convicted of 
negligent homicide and the conviction was affirmed on 
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appeal. There was no evidence of any alcohol or intoxica-
tion being involved. The defendant suffered from Meniere's 
syndrome and had been warned by his doctor not to drive. 
Thereafter, he did drive, had an attack resulting in the acci-
dent causing death. The appellate court confirmed the con-
viction on the grounds that the defendant's negligence in 
driving with Meniere's syndrome was sufficient to make his 
conduct criminal. A reading of the case clearly demon-
strates the medical testimony offered in that case was dif-
ferent than in the instant case and the evidence was exclu-
sively that the accident was caused by Meniere's syndrome. 
The case has no merit in this appeal. 
Finally, it is submitted that the trial court acted properly 
in exercising its discretion to strike the evidence on the 
grounds that the appellant failed to connect the evidence 
relating to Meniere's syndrome to the circumstances of the 
accident. The testimony by all persons concerned would 
exclude the inferences that Meniere's syndrome could have 
been responsible for the appellant's conduct: 
1. Persons who saw the appellant immediately pre-
ceding the accident detected no physical upset. 
2. The appellant admitted the heavy consumption 
of alcohol. 
3. Alcohol will not precipitate Meniere's syndrome 
although it may aggravate a loss of balance occur-
ring during an attack of Meniere's syndrome. 
4. The appellant's testimony was to the effect that 
he fell asleep. 
5. His admission to the police officers was that he fell 
asleep or passed out. 
6. There was no neurological evidence of the appel-
lant having suffered from Meniere's syndrome. 
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7. Meniere's syndrome is not characterized by loss of 
consciousness which appeared to either result prior 
to the accident or as a result of the accident. 
8. The last serious attack of the appellant of the dis-
ease occurred in March 1962 and he was last seen 
by his doctor in October, 1962, some one year prior 
to the accident. 
As a consequence of the above factors, it is clear that 
the appellant failed to connect the evidence relating to 
Meniere's disease to the accident. 
In Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed.,§ 1871, it is noted that a 
motion to strike is a proper remedy to exclude evidence 
which the offering party has failed to connect up with the 
issues in the case. This motion may be made at any time, 
but is most appropriate at the end of the case where full 
opportunity has been given to demonstrate relevancy or 
materiality and there has been a failure in that regard. 
It is obvious, therefore, that the trial court did not com-
mit error nor abuse its discretion in striking from the record 
and from the jury's consideration the evidence relating to 
Meniere's disease. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO 
EVIDENCE THE RESULTS OF THE APPELLANT'S BLOOD 
ALCOHOL TEST. 
A. Accuracy of the Test. 
The appellant challenges the admissibility of the results 
of his blood alcohol test on the grounds that there was no 
proper foundation laid and that it did not appear that the 
test was conducted under circumstances which would guar-
antee reasonable accuracy. A simple reading of the record 
discloses the manifest absurdity of such an allegation. At 
the outset, it should be noted that at the time Exhibits 1, 2 
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and 3 were offered which relate to the appellant's blood 
sample, an objection was raised but it was not made specific. 
No challenge was made to the lack of foundation or the 
remoteness of the exhibit in the objection made by the ap-
pellant's counsel. In State v. Warren, 7 5 Ariz. 123, 252 P.2d 
781 ( 1953), the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that where 
an appellant had failed to make specific his objection to the 
receipt of chemical evidence indicating intoxication at the 
time of trial and where he sought to challenge the admissi-
bility of such evidence because of the lack of reliability of 
the test and proper measures being taken to insure its accu-
racy, that the failure to specifically object and adequately 
state his grounds precluded consideration of the issue on 
appeal. It would appear that the appellant's point on this 
issue should fail for the same reason ( R. 182) . 
An analysis of the record makes it manifest that the blood 
sample was properly taken from the appellant and ap-
propriately handled by all persons, including the State 
Chemist who performed the test. Dr. Burton Janis took the 
blood sample from the defendant which he extracted with 
a prepared sterile syringe ( R. 120, 121 ) . He placed the 
blood in a bottle given to him by Officer Retallick who had 
obtained the bottle from a cabinet in the Salt Lake County 
Hospital which was available to sheriff personnel ( R. 121, 
125). The vial appeared empty and had no anti-coagulant 
(R. 123, 136). Officer Retallick sealed the bottle in which 
the blood was contained and placed his initials on the bottle 
(R. 137). The sample was kept in his possession overnight. 
He put it in his pocket after receiving it from the doctor, 
carried it home where he placed it in his refrigerator. Sub-
sequently, he took the sample, along with Officer Van-
Roosendaal, to the State Chemist. The sample was still 
sealed when it was taken to the State Chemist's office (R. 
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140, 148) . At the office of the State Chemist, H. Kent 
Francis, who had performed numerous tests using the 
Harger method for the detection of blood alcohol ratio, 
performed the same standard test. There was no evidence 
that the vial in which the appellant's blood was placed was 
contaminated with any substance which would impair the 
validity of the test. The procedures followed by Mr. Francis 
were standard procedures for determining the alcohol con-
tent in blood samples. There was no evidence that any of 
the chemicals used by the State Chemist were in any way 
diluted or contrary to standard specifications. Dr. Stewart 
Harvey, a pharmacologist called by the State, indicated 
that if an improper measure of dichromate was used in the 
process that any lack of reliability would immediately ap-
pear (R. 181). He further testified that there were anum-
ber of built-in processes in the Harger method for catching 
errors. The only evidence attacking the reliability of the 
test offered by the defendant was speculative evidence to 
the effect that if the chemical solutions were not properly 
measured or if the vial was contaminated, the results of the 
test might be affected. There was no evidence to show that 
either of these "ifs" had in fact any probability of occur-
rence. Consequently, there is absolutely no evidence which 
would tend to impeach the reliability of the test which was 
performed. In Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, § 665, 
p. 589, it is stated: 
"The specimen or object must have been kept in a 
proper manner after its removal from the defend~nt. 
This may be shown by proof of isolation of the obJect 
or specimen from other objects or specimens, or of the 
proper keeping of the package or container in which 
the object or specimen was kept. It has, however, been 
held that lack of the safeguards which might reason-
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ably be expected does not render the testimony or re-
port inadmissible in the absence of any evidence tend-
ing to show tampering.***" 
A number of cases support the view that blood alcohol 
samples are admissible after a showing that proper pro-
cedures were generally followed in the absence of affirma-
tive evidence tending to impeach the reliability of the test. 
In State v. Webb, 76 Ida. 162, 279 P.2d 634 ( 1955), the 
Idaho Supreme Court had before it a challenge to the ad-
missibility of a blood test in a similar case. It appeared that 
the blood test was taken by medical technologists and that a 
proper laboratory analysis was made in the customary 
manner using a mixture of sulphuric acid and potassium 
bichromate. In denying the claim of error by the appellant, 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"There was nothing in the evidence which would 
even create a suspicion the blood was molested during 
the analysis or that anyone who might be interested in 
tampering with it had access to the hospital laboratory. 
State v. Smith, Mo., 222 S. W. 455; 21 A.L.R.2d 1223n, 
1237n. We believe the evidence was properly ad-
mitted.'' 
See also State v. Coburn, 82 Ida. 437,354 P.2d 751; State v. 
Wendler, 83 Ida. 213,364 P.2d 697. 
The circumstances of this case should be compared with 
those in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. Chugg, 
6 U.2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957), where this court held a 
blood test inadmissible. In that case, the technician was 
unable to identify the sample, could not remember who 
drew the sample and the sample was neither sealed nor 
labeled. The court held that there was a lack of evidence 
to connect the blood sample with the defendant. In Eisen-
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trager v. State, 378 P.2d 526 (Nev. 1963), the Nevada 
Supreme Court ruled that where there was no evidence to 
indicate that the blood sample taken from the appellant 
had been tampered with or otherwise contaminated, the 
evidence would be admitted. 
Certainly there is a presumption of regularity when it 
is shown that regular procedures and standard chemicals 
are used. The fact that pre-mixed chemicals purchased 
from standard drug houses are used, should create an in-
ference that the chemicals were of proper strength since the 
provisions of the Federal Food and Drug Law would pro-
hibit the manufacture and labeling of such items if they 
were to the contrary. See Toulmin, Food, Drugs, Cosmetics, 
Vol. 3, § 5313 and theDrugAmendmentsActof 1962. The 
appellant cites no case which would support his allegation 
that the blood test in this instance should not have been 
admitted. Indeed, no reasonable argument for this proposi-
tion can be sustained. 
B. Remoteness. 
The appellant contends that the trial court committed 
error in admitting the results of the appellant's blood alco-
hol test because the test was taken approximately an hour 
and forty-four minutes after the accident. It is submitted 
that there is no merit to the appellant's contention. 
The basis of the argument is that the appellant's testi-
mony was to the effect that he consumed a half pint of 86 
Proof whiskey approximately fifteen minutes before the 
accident and that assuming this is so, the blood alcohol level 
of the appellant at the time of the accident would have been 
.02 to .03 per cent. It is submitted there are a variety of rea-
sons why the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed. 
First, the jury had before it the evidence in support of the 
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appellant's contention that he had consumed only eight 
ounces ( ~ pint) of liquor within a fifteen minute period 
prior to the accident. They also had the testimony of the 
appellant's medical witnesses that if such were true, a blood 
alcohol level of .02 to .03 would have been the appellant's 
condition at the time of the accident. Consequently, the 
evidence of the blood alcohol test taken approximately an 
hour and forty-four minutes thereafter was fully explained 
from the appellant's point of view and the evidence ad-
mitted as to the level of .193 at the time of testing could 
have only gone to the weight to the test and not its admissi-
bility. It is submitted, however, that there is ample evi-
dence from which the jury could find that the appellant was 
not telling the truth when he said that he consumed the 
liquor within a period immediately preceding the accident. 
Dr. Stewart Harvey testified that the appellant would have 
had to consume approximately 13 ounces of liquor to raise 
his blood alcohol level to .193. Dr. Gordon Evans, who testi-
fied for the appellant, indicated that 8 ounces of 100 Proof 
alcohol (the appellant testified the whiskey he drank was 
86 Proof) would have to be consumed to raise the blood 
alcohol to .191. However, Dr. Evans testified that if the 
blood alcohol level was .193 an hour and forty-four minutes 
after the accident, that body metabolism would have used 
up .04% alcohol at 100 Proof and that the appellant would 
have burned up that amount of alcohol. Consequently, the 
appellant would have had to consume an amount which 
would have raised his blood alcohol level without oxidation 
to .23%. Thus, it is apparent that the appellant must have 
consumed more liquor than what he admitted drinking. 
Since the appellant apparently lied as to this action, the jury 
could well have disregarded his total testimony. Further, 
the evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath at the time 
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of the accident and his erratic driving behavior immediately 
preceding the accident would tend to report the finding that 
his level of consumption was greater than that of .02. Fi-
nally, the appellant's admission that he had fallen asleep 
or "passed out" would tend to support a conclusion that the 
appellant had in fact consumed enough alcohol to pass out. 
Aside from these factors, Mr. Robert Lee's testimony in 
several instances indicated that he had no idea that the 
appellant "had" consumed liquor which, although it might 
have been a slip of the tongue, could have indicated that 
Mr. Lee had some information that the appellant "had" 
consumed liquor (R. 202). Consequently, the jury was 
under no obligation, nor was the court, to assume that the 
appellant's contentions were the truth. 
A number of cases have considered the issue as to whether 
a blood alcohol test taken a few hours after an accident 
should be admitted. Generally, they have allowed the evi-
dence to be considered by the jury. Thus, Donigan, Chemi-
cal Tests and the Law ( 195 7) notes: 
"In connection with persons operating motor vehi-
cles while under the influence of intoxicants, it fre-
quently happens that when they are apprehended 
while in the act or after they have been involved in 
traffic collisions, it is inconvenient or impossible for 
one reason or another to obtain specimens of their 
blood, urine, or breath for chemical analysis immedi .. 
ately after the event. Examples of reasons for delay 
are unavailability of the testing equipment or qualified 
personnel to take the specimen at the moment, the 
need sometimes to travel considerable distances before 
such tests can be conducted, necessity for responsible 
officers to investigate at the scene of the collision and 
to clear up its aftermath before giving full attention to 
the inebriated driver, or the hospitalization of an 
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injured subject before officers are able to request that 
he submit to a chemical test. This means that some-
times the taking of specimens of body fluid or breath 
for the purpose of chemical analyses may take place 
several hours after the act of driving in an impaired 
condition actually occurred. 
"It is only logical that the sooner after the act the 
specimen is taken for analysis, the more accurate will 
be the estimate of blood alcohol concentration at the 
time of the act in issue. But because it could not be or 
was not done immediately after the event, does that 
mean the result of such a chemical test is inadmissible 
in subsequent litigation either civil or criminal? Our 
courts have answered in the negative, unless there are 
statutory time restrictions which otherwise control. 
In the reported decisions in which the issue has been 
raised, the lapse between the occurrence of the event 
and the time of taking of a specimen for analysis has 
ranged from one hour to four hours.'' 
In Toms v. StateJ 95 Okla. Cr. 60, 239 P.2d 812 ( 1952), 
a collision occurred at 3: 30 P.M. and urine and breath tests 
were taken at 5:00 P.M. The court upheld the admission 
of the tests. In State v. AyresJ 70 Ida. 18, 211 P.2d 142 
( 1949), the test was taken approximately three hours after 
the collision and the Idaho Supreme Court held the results 
admissible. See also Bowden v. StateJ 95 Okla. Cr. 382, 246 
P.2d 427 ( 1952) (blood sample three hours after collision 
admitted) and Wimsatt v. StateJ 139 N.E.2d 903 (Ind. 
1957) (breath specimen taken two hours after arrest al-
lowed). Many courts have allowed the results of tests taken 
several hours after an incident to be admitted where there 
is evidence from which the jury could extrapolate the per-
centage of blood alcohol at the time of the incident. State 
v. StairsJ 143 Me. 245, 60 A.2d 141 ( 1948) (elapsed time 
four hours); People v. AbbottJ 101 Cal. App. 2d 200, 225 
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P.2d 283 (1950) (elapsed time three hours); People v. 
Martinez, 38 Cal. 2d 556, 241 P.2d 224 ( 1952) (elapsed 
time one and a half hours). In People v. Decasaus, 150 Cal. 
App. 2d 274, 309 P.2d 835 ( 1957), a blood specimen was 
taken three hours after a collision and the California court 
held the evidence admissible. See cases collected Donigan, 
supra, 1961 supplement, pages 20-21. In this regard, it 
should be noted that those states having statutes limiting 
the admissibility of blood tests taken subsequent to an acci-
dent usually provide that the test is admissible if taken any 
time within two hours of the accident or arrest. Donigan, 
supra, 42--43, 1961 supplement, 21. 
The appellant argues that there is no evidence to con-
tradict his statement as to the time of consumption of the 
alcohol. It is submitted on the basis of the facts indicated 
above that his testimony was in fact contradicted. Even so, 
however, it is clear that the jury need not believe the appel-
lant. In Commonwealth v. Hartman, 179 Penn. Supr.134, 
115 A.2d 820 ( 1955), the same argument was urged before 
the court. In rejecting it, the court noted: 
"The only direct evidence as to the kind and quan-
tity of intoxicants consumed by the defendant and the 
time spent in drinking at the By-bar is in the testimony 
of the defendant himself and that of his companion. 
They both said that they arrived at the tavern after 
3:00 P.M. when the defendant drank 'two beers' and 
no more. The fact that the Commonwealth was not in 
position to prove that the defendant came to the tavern 
earlier in the day or that he consumed more than two 
beers while there was not controlling on the question of 
defendant's guilt. Defendant's credibility and that of 
his witness were for the jury and the weight ascribed 
to their testimony may have had a determining effect 
on the result. The opinions of the police officers who 
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examined defendant at the City Hall immediately 
after the arrest, to the effect that in their opinion he 
then was intoxicated went to the credibility of defend-
ant and his witness. And clearly defendant's condi-
tion within one hour after his arrest, as shown by the 
Intoximeter test on testimony which has not been ques-
tioned, was competent and relevant and was some evi-
dence on the question of whether he was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor while driving his auto-
mobile at the time of the collision. The weight of the 
evidence based on the rest of course was for the jury." 
Although the case was reversed in Commonwealth v. 
Hartman, 383 Penn. 461, 119 A.2d 211, it was reversed 
only on the basis that the state could not appeal. The state-
ment quoted on page 24 of the appellant's brief in fact is not 
a statement of the appellate court, but the reasons which 
the trial court gave in granting a new trial from which the 
state appealed. Therefore, the case before the Pennsylvania 
court in 115 A. 2d 820 ( 19 50) is the highest appellate deter-
mination on the issue which is now urged by appellant and 
that determination was adverse to appellant's present con-
tentions. Under the circumstances of this case, it is apparent 
that the evidence as to the blood alcohol test was a matter 
for the jury's consideration and since the jury is the ultimate 
judge of the credibility of a witness, the trial court did not 
commit error in allowing the jury to weigh the blood alco-
hol test along with the other facts against the appellant's 
claims. State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P.2d 973; State v. 
Sullivan, 6 U.2d 110, 307 P.2d 212. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN DENY-
ING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE; AND IN ANY 
EVENT, THE APPELLANT HAVING GONE FORWARD 
WITH HIS OWN CASE HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
OBJECT. 
The appellant contends that the trial court should have 
dismissed the State's case at the end of the presentation of 
its evidence because there was insufficient proof that the 
appellant was guilty of the offense. It is submitted that there 
is no merit to that contention. The evidence presented by 
the State showed that the appellant drove erratically and 
in a manner which would support an inference that he was 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Subsequent to 
the accident, Mr. George Golightly detected the odor of 
alcohol on the appellant's breath. This, when coupled with 
his previous driving, would tend to support a conclusion 
that the appellant was drunk. The appellant told police 
officers that he either fell asleep or passed out. This would 
tend to evidence a belief on the appellant's part that he had 
consumed sufficient alcohol to cause him to pass out. This 
supports a reasonable inference that the appellant was 
drunk at the time he drove his vehicle over into the lane of 
traffic in which the collision occurred, resulting in the death 
of Fleming Christensen. Finally, the appellant's blood 
alcohol level of .193, when measured against the statutory 
presumptions set out in 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, would tend to support the conclusion that the appel-
lant was driving his vehicle while intoxicated and driving 
it in such a manner to negligently cause the death of the 
charged deceased. Although none of the facts standing 
alone may in and of themselves be sufficient to warrant 
the jury in convicting, the totality of the facts conclusively 
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provide a basis for the jury's result. Further, even assuming 
for the sake of argument that the trial court erred, the 
appellant did not rely upon the State's evidence alone but 
went forward with his own evidence and the appellant him-
self admitted the consumption of alcohol and did so under 
circumstances which tended to impeach his credibility, 
further supporting a conclusion that the appellant was 
drunk at the time of the accident. Consequently, the appel-
lant has waived any claim of error for the trial court's 
failure to dismiss at the end of the State's case. 
In Wigmore, Evidence~ § 2496, it is stated: 
"Conversely, however, he cannot take advantage of 
the judge's original erroneous refusal to direct a verdict 
for insufficiency at the time of the first motion, (a) if 
he does not renew the motion at the close of all the 
evidence, or (b) or if at the time of the final motion 
the ruling correctly refuses to order a verdict for in-
sufficiency; for the Court is at that time entitled to 
decide upon a survey of the whole evidence; and this 
survey naturally renders any prior error immaterial. 
***" 
In the instant case, the trial court at the end of the presenta-
tion of all the evidence correctly refused to dismiss. This 
being so, the appellant is in no position to claim error. In 
State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 511, 178 S.W.2d 449 ( 1944), 
the court said : 
"Since appellant did not stand on it (first demurrer) 
but presented evidence in his own behalf, the trial 
court was bound to take the latter evidence into con-
sideration insofar as it helped the State's case, in ruling 
on the second demurrer at the close of the whole case." 
Since the appellant chose to go forward with his case, the 
only question for this court is whether the evidence at the 
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time of submission of the case to the jury was such that the 
jury could reasonably conclude the defendant's guilt. Since 
the evidence is clearly sufficient to support the finding of the 
appellant's guilt, there is no merit to his third point of error. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case is strong and direct, pointing 
to the guilt of the appellant. The issues claimed for reversal 
on appeal are incidental matters primarily within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. The posture of the case, both at 
trial and on appeal, is such that this court has no other 
alternative but to affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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